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 Abstract 
Cognitive models of psychosis posit that reasoning biases are an important mechanism contributing 
to the formation of psychotic symptoms, in part through transforming anomalous experiences of 
aberrant salience into frank psychotic symptoms. This study aimed to investigate the interplay of 
liberal acceptance (LA) bias, which is a specific type of reasoning bias, and momentary aberrant 
salience in the development of paranoid and psychotic experiences in daily life in first-episode 
psychosis patients (FEP), At-Risk Mental State participants (ARMS), and controls. We used a novel 
experimental Experience Sampling Methodology (eESM) task for measuring LA bias (i.e., decisions 
based on low probability estimates) and ESM measures of momentary aberrant salience, paranoid 
and psychotic experiences in 51 FEP, 46 ARMS, and 53 controls. We found evidence that LA bias was 
more likely to occur in FEP than in controls. Further, LA bias was associated with psychotic and 
paranoid experiences (all p<0.007) and modified the association between momentary aberrant 
salience and psychotic experiences (χ2(df)=7.4(2), p=0.025) in ARMS, such that momentary salience 
was associated with more intense psychotic experiences in the presence of LA bias in ARMS, but not 
in FEP and controls. Our findings suggest that LA bias may be central for anomalous experiences 
such as momentary aberrant salience to increase intensity of psychotic experiences in at-risk 
individuals. Further, LA bias appears to be more likely to be present, but not directly linked to 
current intensity of psychotic experiences, in treated FEP. Novel eESM tasks open new avenues for 
targeting psychological processes under real-world conditions. 
 
Key words: Reasoning bias, aberrant salience, experimental experience sampling methodology, 
prodrome, first-episode psychosis 
 Introduction 
Schizophrenia and other psychoses are disorders with complex phenomenology and aetiology. 
Individuals often present with multifaceted symptoms, which extend phenomenologically and 
temporally from subclinical psychotic experiences to psychotic disorder.1,2 Recent factor analytic 
work suggests one transdiagnostic and five specific symptom dimensions of psychosis.3-5 Arguably, 
this requires reducing heterogeneity by focusing on specific psychological mechanisms and psychotic 
symptoms6,7 and targeting these at an early stage for achieving better outcomes of psychosis.8-11 
Cognitive models of psychosis suggest that reasoning biases are an important mechanism 
contributing to the formation of psychotic symptoms.7,12,13 It has further been posited that reasoning 
biases distort the appraisal of disturbing anomalous experiences such as experiences of aberrant 
novelty and salience and, thereby, contribute to the transformation of these anomalous experiences 
into frank psychotic symptoms, most prominently paranoid delusions and hallucinations.7,13  
 
Recently, a specific type of reasoning bias, i.e., liberal acceptance (LA) bias (or, alternatively, a 
lowered decision threshold), has received more attention.14-17 While the most widely studied 
reasoning bias to date, i.e., a tendency of jumping to conclusions, has been defined as a bias to use 
fewer data to reach a decision,7,11,18-21 LA bias refers to a tendency of making premature decisions 
based on low subjective probability estimates.14,16 One of the paradigms to investigate LA bias has 
built on a task inspired by the television show ‘Who Wants to Be a Millionaire’ developed by Moritz 
et al.16 This forced choice reasoning task requires individuals to provide probability estimates on four 
alternative response options to knowledge questions and, in a next step, asks whether or not they 
want to make a decision in favour of one of the four alternative responses. Reasoning bias in this 
task is indexed by premature decisions, defined as decisions for one of the alternative responses 
based on low probability estimates (i.e., liberal acceptance).16 One advantage of this task may be 
that it is unlikely to be poor motivation that would account for premature decisions as it does not 
impact completion time.16  
 
There is still only a limited amount of research to investigate LA bias in psychosis.14 However, the 
evidence that there is suggests that LA bias is more likely to occur in patients with psychosis.14 In our 
recent Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) study,9 we found that momentary aberrant salience 
was associated with psychotic experiences in daily life, and this association was greatest in 
individuals with an At-Risk Mental State for psychosis (ARMS).2,9,22 However, whether or not, and if 
so how exactly, reasoning biases such as liberal acceptance may interact with, and modify, 
experiences of aberrant salience to transform them into psychotic symptoms, remains to be 
elucidated.7,23,24 While affective disturbances are given an increasingly prominent role in cognitive 
models of psychosis,7,23 mood does not seem to be directly linked to LA bias.15 Also, the role of LA 
bias has yet to be examined in individuals with ARMS or first-episode psychosis (FEP), which would 
allow us to minimize the consequences of illness chronicity and elucidate the influence of LA bias 
across different stages of early psychosis. 
 
Even though several studies have examined reasoning biases in psychosis, no study that we are 
aware of has investigated what role these biases play in individuals’ daily life, outside the research 
laboratory. This may be particularly relevant given reasoning biases may potentially vary within 
individuals over time and across different contexts. Hence, the generalisability of findings from 
research conducted to date to real-world contexts remains limited. This is, however, key if we are to 
better understand which psychological mechanisms to target in individuals’ real lives as a basis for 
achieving more sustainable change and improving outcomes under real-world conditions.8  
 
We used a novel experimental Experience Sampling Methodology (eESM) design that would allow us 
to administer a forced choice reasoning task to assess presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias over 
time under real-world conditions (using a modified version of the task developed by Moritz et al.16) 
and, thereby, advance on previous research by simultaneously optimizing both internal and external 
validity.8 Our aim was to investigate the interplay of LA bias,16 and momentary aberrant salience in 
the development of paranoid and psychotic experiences in daily life using this eESM task for 
measuring presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias in FEP, ARMS, and controls. To this end, we 
sought to test the following hypotheses:  
I) LA bias in daily life is more likely to be present and fluctuate in FEP and ARMS than in controls; 
II) 1) within each group (FEP, ARMS, controls), presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias is 
associated with more intense i) psychotic experiences and ii) paranoid experiences in daily life, 
and 2) these associations are greater in a) FEP than in controls, b) ARMS than controls, and c) 
FEP than ARMS; 
III) the association of experiences of momentary aberrant salience with more intense i) psychotic 
experiences (as previously reported8) and ii) paranoid experiences is modified by presence of, 
and fluctuations in, LA bias in daily life, such that: 1) within each group (FEP, ARMS, controls), 
these associations are greater in the presence vs. absence of (and high vs. low fluctuations in) 
LA bias, and 2) this difference in associations in the presence vs. absence of (and high vs. low 
fluctuations in) LA bias is greater still in a) FEP than in controls, b) ARMS than controls, and c) 
ARMS than FEP; and  
IV) presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias is not associated with affective disturbance in any one 
group. 
 
 
Method 
Sample 
We recruited a sample of FEP, ARMS, and controls identified in the London centre of EU-GEI25 and 
the Childhood Adversity and Psychosis study.  
 FEP: Individuals with FEP were recruited from mental health services in defined catchment areas in 
South-East London, UK.9 Inclusion criteria were: resident in defined catchment areas; aged 18-64; 
presence of a FEP, based on the OPerational CRITeria system (OPCRIT);3,26 and adequate command 
of the English language. Exclusion criteria were: psychotic symptoms precipitated by an organic 
cause; and transient psychotic symptoms resulting from acute intoxication. Participants in hospital at 
time of consent completed ESM assessments after discharge. 
 
ARMS: Individuals with ARMS were recruited from South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation 
Trust, West London Mental Health NHS Trust, and a community survey of General Practitioner (GP) 
practices.9 Inclusion criteria were: presence of an ARMS based on the CAARMS2,9 or the SPI-A9,27-29 
(see Supplementary Table 1); aged 18-35; and adequate command of the English language. Exclusion 
criteria were:  psychotic episode for more than one week as determined by the CAARMS and 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders (SCID)30; previous treatment with an antipsychotic 
for a psychotic episode; IQ<60, measured with an adapted version of the WAIS.25,31 
 
Controls: Controls were recruited using the national postal address file and GP lists as sampling 
frames. Inclusion criteria were: resident in the same areas as FEP; aged 18-64; adequate command 
of the English language. Exclusion criteria for controls were the same as for FEP with the addition of 
the following: personal/family history of psychotic disorder32; presence of psychotic symptoms, 
assessed with the Psychosis Screening Questionnaire33; presence of an ARMS (see above criteria).9 
 
Data collection 
Basic sample characteristics 
Data on socio-demographic characteristics were collected using a socio-demographic schedule.25,34 
DSM-IV diagnoses of psychotic disorder were made based on structured examination of case records 
using OPCRIT3,26 as part of the EU-GEI “Functional Enviromics” study.25 The SCID was used in the 
ARMS sample to assess current comorbid affective disorders30 as part of the EU-GEI High-Risk 
study.25   
 
ESM measures 
Data on psychotic experiences, paranoia, momentary aberrant salience, and negative affect were 
collected using a time-based ESM design with ten assessments scheduled at random within set 
blocks of time over six consecutive days.9 All participants were given an electronic device 
(PsyMate®). A detailed description of the ESM procedure and measures9,16,35-43 is shown in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1]  
 
eESM task: LA bias  
We used a novel eESM task for measuring presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias in individuals’ 
daily life based on a modified version of the task developed by Moritz et al.16 The eESM task is 
described in detail in Table 1. LA bias was defined as a bias towards making premature decisions 
and, more specifically, as making any decision and, in its more marked form, an incorrect decision 
based on a deviation in participants’ likelihood estimations of a given response being correct from 
the ‘rational’ estimate (or, in other words, a lowered decision threshold), consistent with event 
probability estimation tasks.36 The task was scheduled at the end of the ESM assessment of other 
ESM measures using the same time-based design with assessments scheduled at random within set 
blocks of time.  
 
Statistical analysis 
ESM data have a multilevel structure with multiple observations (level-1) nested within participants 
(level-2). We used the ‘melogit’ and ‘mixed’ commands in Stata 1444 to estimate mixed effects 
models for binary and continuous outcomes with random slopes, respectively, while controlling for 
potential confounders (i.e., age, gender, level of education). These models were estimated using 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which provides unbiased estimates using all available 
data under the assumption that data is missing at random and if all variables associated with missing 
values are included in the model.9, 45, 46 First, in order to investigate whether LA bias in daily life is 
more likely to be present in FEP and ARMS than in controls (hypothesis I), we fitted models with 
group as the independent variable and presence (vs. absence) of LA bias as the binary outcome 
variable. We next fitted separate mixed effects models with i) psychotic experiences and ii) paranoid 
experiences as continuous outcome variables and presence of LA bias as binary independent 
variable, and added two-way LA bias × group interactions to test hypothesis II. We further estimated 
models with momentary aberrant salience as independent variable and psychotic experiences as 
continuous outcome variable and added two-way (aberrant salience × LA bias, aberrant salience × 
group, LA bias × group) and three-way (aberrant salience × LA bias × group) interactions to test 
hypothesis III. Finally, we fitted mixed effects models with negative affect as continuous outcome 
variable and presence of LA bias as binary independent variable to test hypothesis IV. 
 
Results 
Basic sample characteristics 
We assessed a total of 165 participants (59 FEP, 51 ARMS, 55 controls) with the ESM during the 
study period. ESM assessment (with ≥20 valid responses) was completed by 150 participants (51 
FEP, 46 ARMS, 53 controls) (Table 2). Psychotic experiences, paranoid experiences, experiences of 
momentary aberrant salience, and affective disturbances were more common in FEP and ARMS than 
in controls (Supplementary Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2]  
 
LA bias in FEP, ARMS, and controls 
Table 3 shows findings on LA bias as measured with the eESM task in FEP, ARMS, and controls. We 
found evidence that LA bias, characterized by making decisions based on probability estimates that 
deviate below rational estimates, was two times more likely to be present in FEP than in controls 
(adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 2.11, p=0.043), while controlling for age and gender. This finding broadly 
held, at trend level (p=0.066), with some attenuation in magnitude (aOR 1.98), when additionally 
adjusting for educational level. LA bias was no more likely to occur in ARMS than in controls (OR 
1.63, p=0.186). 
 
[Insert Table 3]  
 
When we examined LA bias characterized by making incorrect decisions based on probability 
estimates that deviate below rational estimates, LA bias so defined was more than three times more 
likely to be present in FEP than in controls, while controlling for age, gender, and educational level 
(Table 3). Further, compared with controls, LA bias (based on incorrect decisions) was more than two 
times more likely to be present in ARMS after adjustment for age and gender (aOR 2.51, p=0.039), 
but was attenuated in magnitude (aOR 2.04) and no longer statistically significant (p=0.112) after 
controlling for educational level. Overall, a very similar pattern was evident for findings on 
fluctuations in LA bias in FEP, ARMS, and controls over time (Supplementary Table 3-5).  
 
Association of LA bias with psychotic and paranoid experiences  
Findings on the association between LA bias on the one hand, and psychotic and paranoid 
experiences, on the other, in FEP, ARMS, and controls are displayed in Table 4. There was strong 
evidence that LA bias (based on any decision) was associated with more intense psychotic 
experiences (adjusted β (aβ)=0.27, p=0.005) in ARMS. This association fell short of statistical 
significance in both FEP and controls. We found only some evidence that this association was greater 
in ARMS than in controls (aβ=0.24, p=0.082) and lower in FEP than in ARMS (adj. β=-0.22, p=0.081). 
 
[Insert Table 4]  
 
Strong evidence was observed in ARMS, but not in FEP and controls, that LA bias (based on any 
decision) was associated with more intense paranoid experiences (aβ=0.39, p=0.009) (Table 4). This 
association tended to be greater in ARMS than in controls (aβ=0.48, p=0.026; Wald test, p=0.080). 
Again, a very similar pattern of findings was observed for the association of fluctuations in LA bias 
with psychotic and paranoid experiences (Supplementary Table 4). 
 
We found no evidence that LA bias, characterized by making incorrect decisions based on probability 
estimates that deviate below rational estimates, was associated with psychotic or paranoid 
experiences in any one group (Table 4). 
 
Association of momentary aberrant salience with psychotic and paranoid experiences by LA bias 
and group 
When we examined whether the previously reported association between momentary aberrant 
salience and psychotic experiences was modified by presence of LA bias (based on any decision) in 
FEP, ARMS, and controls (Table 5), there was strong evidence that this association was greater in the 
presence vs. absence of LA bias (aβ=0.13, p=0.008) in ARMS, but no evidence that this association 
was modified by LA bias in FEP and controls (Wald test, , p=0.025). The difference in the magnitude 
of associations of momentary aberrant salience with psychotic experiences in the presence vs. 
absence of LA bias was significantly greater in ARMS than in controls (aβ=0.16, p=0.034) and in 
ARMS than in FEP (aβ=0.17, p=0.017). There was no evidence that the association between aberrant 
salience and paranoid experiences was modified by LA bias and group. The pattern of findings on 
associations of aberrant salience with psychotic and paranoid experiences by fluctuations in LA bias 
and group was very similar (Supplementary Table 5). 
 
[Insert Table 5]  
 
Association of LA bias with affective disturbance  
As can be seen in Table 4, we found no evidence that LA bias was associated with more intense 
negative affect in any one group and that these associations varied across FEP, ARMS, and controls. 
 
 
Discussion 
Principal findings 
This study advances on previous research by using, for the first time, an eESM design to investigate 
liberal acceptance as a specific type of reasoning bias in the daily lives of people with FEP and ARMS 
in comparison with controls. Our findings lent support to our first hypothesis that LA bias in daily life 
was more likely to occur (and fluctuate) in FEP than in controls, but much less strong and consistent 
support that LA bias was more likely to occur (and fluctuate) in ARMS than in controls. When we 
examined our second hypothesis, we found evidence that presence of, and fluctuations in, LA bias 
was associated with an increased intensity of psychotic and paranoid experiences in ARMS and some 
evidence, at trend level, that this association was greater in ARMS than in controls. Probing these 
findings further, there was evidence from analyses testing our third hypothesis that LA bias modified 
the association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences, such that this 
association was greater in the presence of, and greater fluctuations in, LA bias in ARMS, but not in 
FEP and controls. Finally, we found no evidence that LA bias was associated with affective 
disturbance in any one group. 
 
Methodological considerations 
This study used a novel eESM task, which operationalized LA bias based on a forced choice reasoning 
task and, thus, did not allow for investigating other aspects of reasoning biases such as the formal 
criterion of draws-to-decision in the beads task. However, this task yielded several methodological 
advances on previous research. These included measuring LA bias repeatedly over time without 
learning effects, keeping the potential impact of poor motivation to a minimum (as premature 
decisions did not affect completion time or length of task) and, probably most importantly, 
delivering, for the first time, an experimental task for measuring cognitive bias under real-world 
conditions. While this novel task showed very good concurrent validity with psychotic experiences 
and clinical status, subsequent studies now need to compare eESM and conventional tasks of 
cognitive bias to elucidate their convergent validity. 
 
The eESM task asked participants to provide probability estimates on response options to 
knowledge questions, so perhaps not unsurprisingly the magnitude of ORs was attenuated for the 
presence of LA bias in ARMS individuals (and to a degree, in FEP individuals) compared with controls 
when controlling for confounding by education level. We cannot rule out, however, that the latter 
may have indexed in part aspects of the cognitive impairments that form part of the 
psychopathology of psychosis and, hence, explain some of the attenuation in ORs. Future research 
should further investigate this link between LA bias, educational level, and IQ and what role difficulty 
of task, developmental age and dosage of antipsychotics may play for the association between LA 
bias and psychotic experiences. Notably, the association between LA bias and psychotic experiences 
in ARMS held independently of, and thus was not confounded by, educational level. One reason for 
p-values of interactions to reach only trend level despite differences in associations across groups 
being of large magnitude in the adjusted models may have been limited power.  
 
ESM assessment is time intensive and data collection may be associated with assessment burden for 
participants. The ESM measure for assessing paranoid experiences consisted of only one item. While 
this item did not cover the full breadth of paranoid experiences and, arguably, a clearer pattern of 
findings may have been observed using a more detailed measure, brevity of ESM measures allowed 
us to balance burden of intensive longitudinal ESM assessment. Also, good concurrent validity was 
observed for this measure of paranoid experiences with ESM measures of psychotic experiences, 
negative affect and threat anticipation (Table 1).  
 
Comparison with previous research 
Numerous studies have investigated reasoning biases in psychosis but evidence on LA bias and, more 
generally, the role that reasoning biases play within individuals across different contexts in daily life 
remained limited. In the current eESM study, we found that liberal acceptance as a specific type of 
reasoning was two to three times more likely to occur in the daily lives of individuals with FEP than 
in controls. This is in line with previous research that suggests LA bias is more likely to occur in 
people with psychosis compared with healthy controls.14 We further observed that the increase in 
the odds of LA bias was more marked in FEP individuals when this was characterized by making 
incorrect decisions based on low probability estimates, which is consistent with findings from the 
study by Moritz et al.16. However, 95% CIs of this finding were within a broadly similar range and 
included the point estimate of the OR for LA bias defined as making any decision based on low 
probability estimates and, hence, differences in magnitude of ORs need to be interpreted with 
caution. There was much less strong and consistent evidence that LA bias was more likely to be 
present in ARMS individuals. This is not too surprising given that only a proportion of those with an 
ARMS will go on to develop a psychotic disorder47 and LA bias has been found to be much less 
relevant in people without mental health problems.14 
 
Echoing previous reports in people with an elevated risk for psychosis,48 we found momentary LA 
bias to be associated with increased intensity of momentary psychotic and paranoid experiences 
within ARMS individuals. Our findings on the association of fluctuations in LA bias with psychotic and 
paranoid experiences in ARMS individuals extended beyond previous research. Further, the absence 
of an association of LA bias with paranoid (and psychotic) experiences in FEP mirrors earlier findings 
on LA bias to be present in people with (enduring) psychotic disorder (e.g., schizophrenia, delusional 
disorder), but not directly linked to current severity of psychotic symptoms (when LA bias was based 
on correct decisions).15 A recent repeated measures online survey to investigate jumping to 
conclusions as another important reasoning bias did, however, report such a link in a small sample of 
people with enduring psychosis.49 There was also no evidence in any one group that LA bias, 
characterized by making incorrect decisions based on low probability estimates, was associated with 
psychotic or paranoid experiences. Garety and Freeman20 emphasized that probabilistic reasoning is 
a useful framework for investigating the nature of paranoid and psychotic symptom development 
precisely because “…it does not simply measure valid conclusions or errors, but assesses the way 
conclusions are reached” (Garety and Freeman,20 p. 123). Our finding seems to support this point as 
any, rather than specifically incorrect, decisions based on low probability estimates were associated 
with an increased intensity of paranoid and psychotic experiences in ARMS individuals. 
 
This finding in ARMS individuals became even more revealing when viewed in the context of 
momentary aberrant salience, which we have previously reported may be particularly relevant to 
intensity of psychotic experiences in this population.9 Aberrant assignment of salience to otherwise 
irrelevant stimuli has been theorized to be the result of excess striatal dopamine, and psychotic 
experiences to emerge as a “top-down” cognitive attempt to make sense of these aberrantly salient 
experiences, which have further been linked to altered reward processing50-56. While there has been 
controversial debate about the number of cognitive alterations that give rise to delusions,57, 58 
(some) cognitive models of psychosis7, 13 posit that the presence of reasoning biases is key for 
anomalous experiences of aberrant salience to transform into frank psychotic symptoms. In line with 
these models, we found that experiences of momentary salience were associated with more intense 
psychotic experiences in the presence of, and greater fluctuations in, LA bias in ARMS individuals 
without any prior treatment with antipsychotics for a psychotic episode. However, there was no 
evidence that this association was modified by LA bias in FEP individuals, who all but one had 
received treatment with antipsychotics, which have been theorized to reduce experiences of 
aberrant salience through their effect on elevated dopamine function.54, 59 This tentatively suggests 
that LA bias may be central for aberrant salience to initially increase intensity of psychotic 
experiences in at-risk individuals, but less relevant for aberrant salience to maintain symptoms in 
treated FEP individuals.  
 
Finally, while affective disturbances play an important role in the aetiology of psychosis, as we have 
recently reported in daily life,8, 60 consistent with previous research,24 we did not find negative affect 
to be directly linked to LA bias.  
 
Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that LA bias in daily life may be most relevant to increase intensity of psychotic 
experiences in ARMS individuals and may be central for anomalous experiences such as experiences 
of aberrant salience to be associated with more intense psychotic experiences. Moreover, LA bias in 
daily life appears to be more likely to occur and, hence, to be most pronounced, in individuals with a 
first-episode of psychotic disorder, but, in treated FEP individuals, does not seem to be directly 
linked to an increased intensity of, and maintain, psychotic experiences. The current study further 
illustrates that the scope of eESM tasks for measuring fluctuations in not only reasoning biases but 
also other psychological processes under real-world conditions is considerable and may help 
improve our understanding of these processes in the development of psychosis. Novel eESM tasks 
further open new avenues for identifying and targeting the dynamic of basic psychological 
dimensions in daily life. An important next step will be to conduct clinical translational research 
using ecological interventionist causal models for modifying reasoning bias (and other psychological 
processes) in daily life through novel, personalized ecological momentary interventions8, 61 in the 
early stages of symptom development and, thereby, prevent transformation of anomalous 
experiences into full-blown psychotic symptoms. 
 
Funding 
This work was supported by a Veni grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(grant no. 451-13-022) and a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship of the UK National Institute for 
Health Research (grant no. NIHR-PDF-201104065) to UR. The work was also supported by funding 
from the Wellcome Trust (WT087417) to CM and is an approved add-on study of the “The European 
Network of National Networks studying Gene-Environment Interactions in Schizophrenia” (EU-GEI), 
which is supported by funding from the European Union (European Community’s Seventh 
Framework Program [HEALTH-F2-2009–241909; Project EU-GEI]). The authors acknowledge financial 
support from the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre for Mental Health at South London and 
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King’s College London. The views expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. 
 References 
1. Linscott RJ, van Os J. An updated and conservative systematic review and meta-analysis of 
epidemiological evidence on psychotic experiences in children and adults: on the pathway 
from proneness to persistence to dimensional expression across mental disorders. Psychol 
Med. 2013;43(6):1133-1149. 
2. Yung AR, Yuen HP, McGorry PD, Phillips LJ, Kelly D, Dell'Olio M, Francey SM, Cosgrave EM, 
Killackey E, Stanford C, Godfrey K, Buckby J. Mapping the onset of psychosis: the 
Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2005;39(11-
12):964-971. 
3. Reininghaus U, Bohnke JR, Hosang G, Farmer A, Burns T, McGuffin P, Bentall RP. Evaluation 
of the validity and utility of a transdiagnostic psychosis dimension encompassing 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Br J Psychiatry. 2016;209(2):107-113. 
4. Reininghaus U, Priebe S, Bentall RP. Testing the psychopathology of psychosis: evidence for a 
general psychosis dimension. Schizophr Bull. 2013;39(4):884-895. 
5. Shevlin M, McElroy E, Bentall RP, Reininghaus U, Murphy J. The psychosis continuum: testing 
a bifactor model of psychosis in a general population sample. Schizophr Bull. 2016. 
6. Cannon TD, Keller MC. Endophenotypes in the genetic analyses of mental disorders. Annu 
Rev Clin Psychol. 2006;2:267-290. 
7. Garety PA, Bebbington P, Fowler D, Freeman D, Kuipers E. Implications for neurobiological 
research of cognitive models of psychosis: a theoretical paper. Psychol Med. 
2007;37(10):1377-1391. 
8. Reininghaus U, Depp CA, Myin-Germeys I. Ecological interventionist causal models in 
psychosis: targeting psychological mechanisms in daily life. Schizophr Bull. 2016;42(2):264-
269. 
9. Reininghaus U, Kempton MJ, Valmaggia L, Craig TK, Garety P, Onyejiaka A, Gayer-Anderson 
C, So SH, Hubbard K, Beards S, Dazzan P, Pariante C, Mondelli V, Fisher HL, Mills JG, 
Viechtbauer W, McGuire P, van Os J, Murray RM, Wykes T, Myin-Germeys I, Morgan C. 
Stress sensitivity, aberrant salience, and threat anticipation in early psychosis: an experience 
sampling study. Schizophr Bull. 2016;42(3):712-722. 
10. Garety PA, Fowler DG, Freeman D, Bebbington P, Dunn G, Kuipers E. Cognitive--behavioural 
therapy and family intervention for relapse prevention and symptom reduction in psychosis: 
randomised controlled trial. Br J Psychiatry. 2008;192(6):412-423. 
11. Garety P, Waller H, Emsley R, Jolley S, Kuipers E, Bebbington P, Dunn G, Fowler D, Hardy A, 
Freeman D. Cognitive mechanisms of change in delusions: an experimental investigation 
targeting reasoning to effect change in paranoia. Schizophr Bull. 2015;41(2):400-410. 
12. Freeman D, Garety P. Advances in understanding and treating persecutory delusions: a 
review. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol. 2014;49(8):1179-1189. 
13. Garety PA, Kuipers E, Fowler D, Freeman D, Bebbington PE. A cognitive model of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis. Psychol Med. 2001;31(2):189-195. 
14. Moritz S, Pfuhl G, Ludtke T, Menon M, Balzan RP, Andreou C. A two-stage cognitive theory of 
the positive symptoms of psychosis. Highlighting the role of lowered decision thresholds. J 
Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry. 2017;56:12-20. 
15. Moritz S, Veckenstedt R, Randjbar S, Hottenrott B, Woodward TS, von Eckstaedt FV, Schmidt 
C, Jelinek L, Lincoln TM. Decision making under uncertainty and mood induction: further 
evidence for liberal acceptance in schizophrenia. Psychol Med. 2009;39(11):1821-1829. 
16. Moritz S, Woodward TS, Hausmann D. Incautious reasoning as a pathogenetic factor for the 
development of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 2006;32(2):327-331. 
17. Moritz S, Woodward TS, Jelinek L, Klinge R. Memory and metamemory in schizophrenia: a 
liberal acceptance account of psychosis. Psychol Med. 2008;38(6):825-832. 
18. Lincoln TM, Ziegler M, Mehl S, Rief W. The jumping to conclusions bias in delusions: 
specificity and changeability. J Abnorm Psychol. 2010;119(1):40-49. 
19. Moritz S, Woodward TS. Jumping to conclusions in delusional and non-delusional 
schizophrenic patients. Br J Clin Psychol. 2005;44(Pt 2):193-207. 
20. Garety PA, Freeman D. Cognitive approaches to delusions: a critical review of theories and 
evidence. Br J Clin Psychol. 1999;38 ( Pt 2):113-154. 
21. Ward T, Garety PA. Fast and slow thinking in distressing delusions: A review of the literature 
and implications for targeted therapy. Schizophr Res. 2017. 
22. Fusar-Poli P, Borgwardt S, Bechdolf A, Addington J, Riecher-Rossler A, Schultze-Lutter F, 
Keshavan M, Wood S, Ruhrmann S, Seidman LJ, Valmaggia L, Cannon T, Velthorst E, De Haan 
L, Cornblatt B, Bonoldi I, Birchwood M, McGlashan T, Carpenter W, McGorry P, Klosterkotter 
J, McGuire P, Yung A. The psychosis high-risk state: a comprehensive state-of-the-art review. 
JAMA Psychiatry. 2013;70(1):107-120. 
23. Freeman D, Garety PA, Kuipers E, Fowler D, Bebbington PE. A cognitive model of persecutory 
delusions. Br J Clin Psychol. 2002;41(Pt 4):331-347. 
24. Garety PA, Freeman D, Jolley S, Dunn G, Bebbington PE, Fowler DG, Kuipers E, Dudley R. 
Reasoning, emotions, and delusional conviction in psychosis. J Abnorm Psychol. 
2005;114(3):373-384. 
25. European Network of National Networks studying Gene-Environment Interactions in 
Schizophrenia, van Os J, Rutten BP, Myin-Germeys I, Delespaul P, Viechtbauer W, van Zelst C, 
Bruggeman R, Reininghaus U, Morgan C, Murray RM, Di Forti M, McGuire P, Valmaggia LR, 
Kempton MJ, Gayer-Anderson C, Hubbard K, Beards S, Stilo SA, Onyejiaka A, Bourque F, 
Modinos G, Tognin S, Calem M, O'Donovan MC, Owen MJ, Holmans P, Williams N, Craddock 
N, Richards A, Humphreys I, Meyer-Lindenberg A, Leweke FM, Tost H, Akdeniz C, Rohleder C, 
Bumb JM, Schwarz E, Alptekin K, Ucok A, Saka MC, Atbasoglu EC, Guloksuz S, Gumus-Akay G, 
Cihan B, Karadag H, Soygur H, Cankurtaran ES, Ulusoy S, Akdede B, Binbay T, Ayer A, Noyan 
H, Karadayi G, Akturan E, Ulas H, Arango C, Parellada M, Bernardo M, Sanjuan J, Bobes J, 
Arrojo M, Santos JL, Cuadrado P, Rodriguez Solano JJ, Carracedo A, Garcia Bernardo E, 
Roldan L, Lopez G, Cabrera B, Cruz S, Diaz Mesa EM, Pouso M, Jimenez E, Sanchez T, Rapado 
M, Gonzalez E, Martinez C, Sanchez E, Olmeda MS, de Haan L, Velthorst E, van der Gaag M, 
Selten JP, van Dam D, van der Ven E, van der Meer F, Messchaert E, Kraan T, Burger N, 
Leboyer M, Szoke A, Schurhoff F, Llorca PM, Jamain S, Tortelli A, Frijda F, Vilain J, Galliot AM, 
Baudin G, Ferchiou A, Richard JR, Bulzacka E, Charpeaud T, Tronche AM, De Hert M, van 
Winkel R, Decoster J, Derom C, Thiery E, Stefanis NC, Sachs G, Aschauer H, Lasser I, 
Winklbaur B, Schlogelhofer M, Riecher-Rossler A, Borgwardt S, Walter A, Harrisberger F, 
Smieskova R, Rapp C, Ittig S, Soguel-dit-Piquard F, Studerus E, Klosterkotter J, Ruhrmann S, 
Paruch J, Julkowski D, Hilboll D, Sham PC, Cherny SS, Chen EY, Campbell DD, Li M, Romeo-
Casabona CM, Emaldi Cirion A, Urruela Mora A, Jones P, Kirkbride J, Cannon M, Rujescu D, 
Tarricone I, Berardi D, Bonora E, Seri M, Marcacci T, Chiri L, Chierzi F, Storbini V, Braca M, 
Minenna MG, Donegani I, Fioritti A, La Barbera D, La Cascia CE, Mule A, Sideli L, Sartorio R, 
Ferraro L, Tripoli G, Seminerio F, Marinaro AM, McGorry P, Nelson B, Amminger GP, Pantelis 
C, Menezes PR, Del-Ben CM, Gallo Tenan SH, Shuhama R, Ruggeri M, Tosato S, Lasalvia A, 
Bonetto C, Ira E, Nordentoft M, Krebs MO, Barrantes-Vidal N, Cristobal P, Kwapil TR, Brietzke 
E, Bressan RA, Gadelha A, Maric NP, Andric S, Mihaljevic M, Mirjanic T. Identifying gene-
environment interactions in schizophrenia: contemporary challenges for integrated, large-
scale investigations. Schizophr Bull. 2014;40(4):729-736. 
26. McGuffin P, Farmer A, Harvey I. A polydiagnostic application of operational criteria in studies 
of psychotic illness. Development and reliability of the OPCRIT system. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 
1991;48(8):764-770. 
27. Klosterkotter J, Schultze-Lutter F, Bechdolf A, Ruhrmann S. Prediction and prevention of 
schizophrenia: what has been achieved and where to go next? World Psychiatry. 
2011;10(3):165-174. 
28. Mills JG. Defining the prevalence of subjects at Ultra High Risk of developing psychosis in the 
general population. London, King's College London; 2014. 
29. Schultze-Lutter F, Ruhrmann S, Fusar-Poli P, Bechdolf A, Schimmelmann BG, Klosterkotter J. 
Basic symptoms and the prediction of first-episode psychosis. Curr Pharm Des. 
2012;18(4):351-357. 
30. First MB, Spitzer RL, Gibbon M, Williams JBW. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR 
Axis I Disorders. . New York: Biometrics Research, New York State Psychiatric Institute; 2002. 
31. Ryan JJ, Weilage ME, Spaulding WD. Accuracy of the seven subtest WAIS-R short form in 
chronic schizophrenia. Schizophr Res. 1999;39(1):79-83. 
32. Maxwell E. Manual for the Family Interview of Genetic Studies (FIGS). St. Louis: Center for 
Collaborative Genetic Studies on Mental Disorders; 1992. 
33. Bebbington P, Nayani T. The Psychosis Screening Questionnaire. Int J Methods Psychiatr Res. 
1995;5(1):11-19. 
34. Mallet R. Sociodemographic schedule. London, UK: Section of Social Psychiatry, Institute of 
Psychiatry; 1997. 
35. Delespaul P, deVries M, van Os J. Determinants of occurrence and recovery from 
hallucinations in daily life. Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol. 2002;37(3):97-104. 
36. Huq SF, Garety PA, Hemsley DR. Probabilistic judgements in deluded and non-deluded 
subjects. Q J Exp Psychol A. 1988;40(4):801-812. 
37. Lardinois M, Lataster T, Mengelers R, Van Os J, Myin-Germeys I. Childhood trauma and 
increased stress sensitivity in psychosis. Acta Psychiatr Scand. 2011;123(1):28-35. 
38. Myin-Germeys I, Marcelis M, Krabbendam L, Delespaul P, van Os J. Subtle fluctuations in 
psychotic phenomena as functional states of abnormal dopamine reactivity in individuals at 
risk. Biol Psychiatry. 2005;58(2):105-110. 
39. Myin-Germeys I, van Os J, Schwartz JE, Stone AA, Delespaul PA. Emotional reactivity to daily 
life stress in psychosis. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2001;58(12):1137-1144. 
40. Palmier-Claus JE, Dunn G, Lewis SW. Emotional and symptomatic reactivity to stress in 
individuals at ultra-high risk of developing psychosis. Psychol Med. 2012;42(5):1003-1012. 
41. Palmier-Claus JE, Myin-Germeys I, Barkus E, Bentley L, Udachina A, Delespaul PA, Lewis SW, 
Dunn G. Experience sampling research in individuals with mental illness: reflections and 
guidance. Acta Psychiatr Scand. 2011;123(1):12-20. 
42. So SH. Change in delusions with treatment and the role of reasoning. London: King’s College 
London, Institute of Psychiatry, University of London; 2012. 
43. Myin-Germeys I, Delespaul P, van Os J. Behavioural sensitization to daily life stress in 
psychosis. Psychol Med. 2005;35(5):733-741. 
44. StataCorp. Stata Statistical Software: Release 14. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP; 2015. 
45. Little T, Rubin D. Analysis with Missing Data. New York: John Wiley & Sons; 1987. 
46. Mallinckrodt CH, Clark WS, David SR. Accounting for dropout bias using mixed-effects 
models. J Biopharm Stat. 2001;11(1-2):9-21. 
47. Fusar-Poli P, Bonoldi I, Yung AR, Borgwardt S, Kempton MJ, Valmaggia L, Barale F, Caverzasi 
E, McGuire P. Predicting psychosis: meta-analysis of transition outcomes in individuals at 
high clinical risk. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2012;69(3):220-229. 
48. Moritz S, Goritz AS, Gallinat J, Schafschetzy M, Van Quaquebeke N, Peters MJ, Andreou C. 
Subjective competence breeds overconfidence in errors in psychosis. A hubris account of 
paranoia. J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry. 2015;48:118-124. 
49. Ludtke T, Kriston L, Schroder J, Lincoln TM, Moritz S. Negative affect and a fluctuating 
jumping to conclusions bias predict subsequent paranoia in daily life: An online experience 
sampling study. J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry. 2017;56:106-112. 
50. Gold JM, Waltz JA, Prentice KJ, Morris SE, Heerey EA. Reward processing in schizophrenia: a 
deficit in the representation of value. Schizophr Bull. 2008;34(5):835-847. 
51. Hoffman RE, Woods SW, Hawkins KA, Pittman B, Tohen M, Preda A, Breier A, Glist J, 
Addington J, Perkins DO, McGlashan TH. Extracting spurious messages from noise and risk of 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders in a prodromal population. Br J Psychiatry. 2007;191:355-
356. 
52. Howes OD, Kapur S. The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia: version III--the final 
common pathway. Schizophr Bull. 2009;35(3):549-562. 
53. Howes OD, Murray RM. Schizophrenia: an integrated sociodevelopmental-cognitive model. 
Lancet. 2014;383(9929):1677-1687. 
54. Kapur S. Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, 
phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. Am J Psychiatry. 2003;160(1):13-23. 
55. Kapur S, Mizrahi R, Li M. From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, 
pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. Schizophr Res. 2005;79(1):59-68. 
56. Vercammen A, Aleman A. Semantic expectations can induce false perceptions in 
hallucination-prone individuals. Schizophr Bull. 2010;36(1):151-156. 
57. Coltheart M. Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove). 
2007;60(8):1041-1062. 
58. Corlett PR, Honey GD, Fletcher PC. From prediction error to psychosis: ketamine as a 
pharmacological model of delusions. J Psychopharmacol. 2007;21(3):238-252. 
59. Roiser JP, Stephan KE, den Ouden HE, Barnes TR, Friston KJ, Joyce EM. Do patients with 
schizophrenia exhibit aberrant salience? Psychol Med. 2009;39(2):199-209. 
60. Klippel A, Myin-Germeys I, Chavez-Baldini U, Preacher KJ, Kempton M, Valmaggia L, Calem 
M, So S, Beards S, Hubbard K, Gayer-Anderson C, Onyejiaka A, Wichers M, McGuire P, 
Murray R, Garety P, van Os J, Wykes T, Morgan C, Reininghaus U. Modelling the interplay 
between psychological processes and adverse, stressful contexts and experiences in 
pathways to psychosis: an experience sampling study. Schizophr Bull. 2017;43(2):302-315. 
61. Steinhart H, Myin-Germeys I, Reininghaus U. Translating treatment of mental health 
problems to daily life: a guide to the development of ecological momentary interventions. 
In: Palmier-Claus J, Haddock G, Varese F, eds. Novel uses of experience sampling in mental 
health research. London, UK: Routledge; in press. 
 
 
Table 1. ESM procedurea, eESM task for measuring liberal acceptance bias, and ESM measures of momentary aberrant salience, negative affect, psychotic and paranoid experiences. 
Domain eESM task 
Liberal acceptance 
(LA) bias 
We used an eESM task for measuring liberal acceptance bias, asking individuals to provide probability estimates on four alternative response options to one 
knowledge question each time when an ESM assessment was scheduled. The probability estimates ranged from 0-100% and were grouped and presented as 
categorical variable (0%, 1-9%, 10-19% 20-29%,…, 90-99%, 100%) to reduce complexity and the potential impact of poor task comprehension. In a next step, 
participants were asked whether or not they want to make a decision and select one of the four alternative responses. The questions were designed to be 
similar to those asked in the television show ‘Who Wants to Be a Millionaire’, but selected based on their property that the likelihood for a response option 
being correct would seem equal across all four options (e.g. Question: “What would be the colour of Coca-Cola without colouring?”; Response options: “A: 
orange, B: green, C: brown, D: colourless”). Hence, in line with the rational estimate of 50% for first estimations in the beads task (with no evidence on which 
to base estimations),36 the rational estimate would be 25% for any set of 4 response options in this eESM liberal acceptance task (i.e., an estimate of <20-
29% on the simplified, categorical variable).  
   LA bias 
   (any decision) 
Presence of liberal acceptance bias was defined as 1) any decisions made based on estimates of the likelihood of a selected response being correct below 
20-29% and thus deviating below the rational estimate (in the absence of evidence on which to base estimations), whereas absence of liberal acceptance 
bias was defined as decisions made based on likelihood estimates equal to or above 20-29% (on the simplified, categorical variable) or not wanting to make a 
decision. 
  LA bias 
  (incorrect decision) 
Consistent with Moritz et al.,16 incorrect decisions based on low probability estimates were also considered to be indexing presence of (more marked) 
liberal acceptance bias, defined as 2) making an incorrect decision based on estimates of the likelihood of a selected response being correct below the 
rational estimate (i.e., an estimate <20-29% on the categorical probability estimate variable). 
  Fluctuations in LA  
  bias (variability, 
instability) 
In line with previous experience sampling research,38 fluctuations in liberal acceptance bias were operationalized as variability (i.e. differences between LA 
bias in the moment and the average LA bias within individuals over the 6-day assessment period, calculated as the squared difference between LA bias at 
each timepoint and mean LA bias within subjects over time) and instability (i.e., differences in LA bias from one moment to the next, calculated as the 
squared difference between LA bias at timepoint t and LA bias at timepoint t-1 within subjects and days).   
 ESM measures 
Experiences of 
aberrant novelty 
and salience 
A modified version of the 3-item ESM measure of momentary aberrant salience by So42 was employed, asking participants to rate the following items on a 7-
point Likert scale (ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7 (‘very much’)): ‘Everything grabs my attention right now’, ‘Everything seems to have meaning right now’, 
and ‘I notice things that I haven’t noticed before’.42 
Negative affect We used a 5-item ESM measure for assessing negative affect. This measure asks participants to rate the following items at each entry point on a 7-point Likert scale: ‘I feel anxious’, ‘I feel down’, ‘I feel lonely’, ‘I feel insecure’, and ‘I feel annoyed’ (Cronbach’s ɑ=0.86).39 
Psychotic 
experiences 
The ESM psychosis measure was used to assess intensity of psychotic experiences.  It consists of eight items (i.e., ‘I feel paranoid’, ‘I feel unreal’, ‘I hear things 
that aren’t really there’, ‘I see things that aren’t really there’, ‘I can’t get these thoughts out of my head’, ‘My thoughts are influenced by others’, ‘It's hard to 
express my thoughts in words’, ‘I feel like I am losing control’) rated on a 7-point Likert scale (Cronbach’s ɑ=0.90).38,39,43 We observed good concurrent 
validity of ESM measures of negative affect and psychotic experiences (r=0.68, p<0.001). 
Paranoid 
experiences 
The item ‘I feel paranoid’ of the ESM psychosis measure was used to assess paranoid experiences. There was good concurrent validity for this measure of 
paranoid experiences with ESM measures of psychotic experiences (score calculated excluding the item ‘I feel paranoid’; r=0.78, p<0.001), negative affect 
(r=0.67, p<0.001) and threat anticipation (r=0.54, p<0.001).  
a ESM procedure: On each day over an assessment period of six consecutive days, the PsyMate® emitted ten ‘beep’ signals at random moments within set blocks of time. The length of time for each of these blocks 
was 90 minutes within which a random signal was emitted. During an initial briefing session, participants were asked to stop their activity and answer questions about thoughts, feelings, behaviours, social situations, 
and neighbourhood surroundings each time the device emitted the beep signal. The ESM questionnaire was available to participants for the duration of 10 minutes after emission of the beep signal. Participants 
were not paid per completed response but contacted at least once during the assessment period to assess their adherence to instructions, identify any potential distress associated with the method, and maximise 
the number of observations per participant. At the end of the assessment period, participants’ reactivity to, and compliance with, the method was examined in a debriefing session. Participants were required to 
provide valid responses to at least one-third of the emitted beeps, which is a very widely established criterion on the bare minimum of ESM completion for participants to be included in the analysis recommended in 
methodological guidelines on experience sampling methodology41 and used in numerous experience sampling studies to date.35,37-40 Earlier ESM studies in samples of patients with psychotic disorder,37-40 ARMS,40 
and controls37-40 have demonstrated the feasibility, reliability and validity of the assessment method.35,37-41 
Table 2. Basic sample characteristics (n=150) 
 FEP  
(n=51) 
ARMS 
(n=46) 
Controls 
(n=53) Test statistic p 
Age (years), mean (S.D.) 28.3 (8.6) 23.6 (4.7) 35.0 (12.6) F (2,147)=18.6 <0.001 
Gender, n (%)      
 Men 28 (54.9) 21 (45.7) 25 (47.2) 
χ2=1.0, df=2 0.612  Women 23 (45.1) 25 (54.4) 28 (52.8) 
Level of education, n (%)      
 School 17 (33.3) 13 (28.9) 8 (15.1) 
χ2=24.3, df=4 <0.001  Further 25 (49.0) 24 (53.3) 15 (28.3) 
 Higher 9 (17.7) 8 (17.8) 30 (56.6) 
OPCRIT Psychotic disorder 
diagnosisa, n (%) 
     
 Schizophrenia 15 (31.3) – – 
– – 
 Delusional disorder 3 (6.3) – – 
 Schizoaffective disorder 3 (6.3) – – 
 Manic psychosis 7 (14.6) – – 
 Depressive psychosis 7 (14.6) – – 
 Psychotic disorder NOS 13 (27.1) – – 
SCID Comorbid affective disorder 
diagnosis, n (%) 
     
 Mood disorder – 5 (10.9) –   
 Anxiety disorder – 15 (32.6) – – – 
 Mood and anxiety disorder – 3 (6.5) –   
Psychotropic medicationb, n (%)      
 Antipsychotic 40 (81.6) 5 (11.9) 0 (0.0) 
– – 
  Atypical 36 (76.6) 5 (11.9) 0 (0.0) 
  Typical 1 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
  Atypical and typical 1 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 Antidepressant 11 (22.9) 17 (40.5) 0 (0.0) 
 Other 12 (25.0) 4 (9.5) 9 (17.0) 
 None 4 (8.2) 22 (52.4) 44 (83.0)   
Note: FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; S.D., standard deviation; df, degrees of freedom; OPCRIT, 
Operational Criteria system; SCID, Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders 
†OPCIT diagnoses not assessed in ARMS from EU-GEI High-Risk study 
‡ SCID diagnoses not assessed in FEP and controls in the EU-GEI Functional Enviromics study 
Missing values:  a3, b6 
§Participants included/excluded (of n=165 assessed) and reasons for exclusion: 
 
 FEP ARMS Controls Test statistic p 
      
Included (n=150) 51 (86.4) 46 (90.2) 53 (96.4) 
χ2=3.4, df=2 0.179 
Excluded (n=15) 8 (13.6) 5 (9.8) 2 (3.6) 
Reasons for exclusion (n=15)      
   Stopped ESM assessment 1 1 2   
   Did not return PsyMate 0 1 0   
   Technical problems 1 0 0   
   ≥20 valid responses 6 3 0   
 
 
 
Table 3. Liberal acceptance bias in FEP, ARMS, and controls  
 unadj. OR 95% CI p  adj. ORa 95% CI p  adj. ORb 95% CI p 
           
Presence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision)c            
 FEPe 2.17 (1.07 – 4.40) 0.032  2.11 (1.02 – 4.38) 0.043  1.98 (0.96 – 4.10) 0.066 
 ARMSf 1.63 (0.79 – 3.40) 0.186  1.52 (0.68 – 3.42) 0.312  1.29 (0.57 – 2.92) 0.546 
 Controls 1.00    1.00    1.00   
Presence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect 
decisions)d        
    
 FEPe 3.44 (1.62 – 7.31) 0.001  3.48 (1.60 – 7.57) 0.002  3.13 (1.45 – 6.78) 0.004 
 ARMSf 2.56 (1.17 – 5.59) 0.019  2.51 (1.05 – 6.00) 0.039  2.04 (0.85 – 4.92) 0.112 
 Controls 1.00    1.00    1.00   
Note: FEP, first-episode psychosis; ARMS, at-risk mental state for psychosis; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval 
a Adjusted for age and gender  
b Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education  
c Presence of liberal acceptance bias: making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias 
defined as making decisions based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
d Presence of liberal acceptance bias: making incorrect decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal 
acceptance bias defined as making incorrect or correct decisions based on high probability estimate (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
eMissing values, n=1, fMissing values, n=2
Table 4. Association of liberal acceptance biasa,b with psychotic experiences, paranoid experiences and negative affect in daily life by group (FEP, ARMS, controls)c 
 FEPd  ARMSe  Controls  LR testd,e 
 adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  χ2 (df) p 
    
 Outcome: Psychotic experiences   
Liberal acceptance bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance biasa 0.05 (-0.11 – 0.21) 0.540  0.27 (0.08 – 0.46) 0.005  0.03 (-0.16 – 0.23) 0.736  4.0 (2) 0.138 
Liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.06 (-0.28 – 0.17) 0.616  0.07 (-0.18 – 0.33) 0.569  0.07 (-0.23 – 0.37) 0.645  0.7 (2) 0.691 
    
 Outcome: Paranoid experiences   
Liberal acceptance bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance biasa 0.10 (-0.15 – 0.36) 0.423  0.39 (0.10 – 0.69) 0.009  -0.09 (-0.39 – 0.22) 0.572  5.1 (2) 0.080 
Liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.03 (-0.30 – 0.24) 0.833  0.23 (-0.09 – 0.55) 0.158  -0.05 (-0.46 – 0.36) 0.801  1.8 (2) 0.407 
    
 Outcome: Negative affect   
Liberal acceptance bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance biasa 0.06 (-0.18 – 0.30) 0.633  -0.10 (-0.37 – 0.18) 0.486  -0.17 (-0.45 – 0.11) 0.237  1.6 (2) 0.449 
Liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b 0.06 (-0.19 – 0.32) 0.626  -0.19 (-0.49 – 0.12) 0.236  -0.20 (-0.59 – 0.18) 0.299  2.0 (2) 0.360 
Note: FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; df, degrees of freedom; vs., versus; CI, confidence interval; LR, likelihood ratio for interaction 
a Presence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision): making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias defined as making 
decisions based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
b Presence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions): making incorrect decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias 
defined as making incorrect or correct decisions based on high probability estimate (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
c Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education 
dMissing values, n=1, eMissing values, n=2 
f Two-way interaction for liberal acceptance bias × group as included in the following model, with yij for psychotic or paranoid experiences or negative affect as outcome variable: yij  = β0 + β1(LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij) + 
β2(GROUPj) + β3(LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij  × GROUPj) + ε ij  (full model not shown and available upon request) 
g Difference in associations across groups for significant for two-way interaction for liberal acceptance bias × group: 
 FEP vs. controls  ARMS vs. controls  FEP vs. ARMS 
 adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p 
  Outcome: Psychotic experiences 
Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision)a 0.02 (-0.24 – 0.27) 0.890  0.24 (-0.03 – 0.51) 0.082  -0.22 (-0.47 – 0.03) 0.081 
Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.13 (-0.50 – 0.25) 0.503  0.00 (-0.39 – 0.40) 0.986  -0.13 (-0.47 – 0.21) 0.448 
  Outcome: Paranoid experiences 
Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision)a 0.19 (-0.21 – 0.59) 0.343  0.48 (0.06 – 0.91) 0.026  -0.29 (-0.68 – 0.10) 0.144 
Presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions)b 0.02 (-0.47 – 0.52) 0.923  0.28 (-0.24 – 0.81) 0.286  -0.26 (-0.68 – 0.16) 0.222 
Table 5. Association between momentary aberrant salience, psychotic and paranoid experiences by liberal acceptance (LA) biasa and group (FEP, ARMS, controls)b  
 FEPc  ARMSd  Controls  LR testc,d  
 adj. β (95% CI) P  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  χ
2 (df) p 
    
 Outcome: Psychotic experiences   
Momentary aberrant salience × LA bias (any decision)a × 
groupe,f          7.40 (2) 0.025 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by LA bias:            
  Presence of LA bias 0.16 (0.06 – 0.25) 0.001  0.36 (0.27 – 0.46) <0.001  0.15 (0.04 – 0.27) 0.008    
  Absence of LA bias 0.20 (0.17 – 0.22) <0.001  0.24 (0.21 – 0.26) <0.001  0.18 (0.15 – 0.22) <0.001    
  Presence vs. absence -0.04 (-0.13 – 0.05) 0.400  0.13 (0.03 – 0.22) 0.008  -0.03 (-0.14 – 0.08) 0.600    
              
 Outcome: Paranoid experiences   
Momentary aberrant salience × LA bias (any decision)a × 
groupe,f          3.7 (2) 0.160 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by LA bias:            
  Presence of LA bias 0.08 (-0.07 -0.24) 0.273  0.32 (0.17 – 0.47) <0.001  0.10 (-0.08 – 0.28) 0.291    
  Absence of LA bias 0.19 (0.14 – 0.23) <0.001  0.23 (0.18 – 0.28) <0.001  0.17 (0.11 – 0.23) <0.001    
  Presence vs. absence -0.10 (-0.25 – 0.05) 0.188  0.09 (-0.05 – 0.24) 0.215  -0.07 (-0.25 – 0.11) 0.451    
Note: FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; LA bias, liberal acceptance bias; df, degrees of freedom; vs., versus; CI, confidence interval; LR, likelihood ratio for interaction 
a Presence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision): making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias defined 
as making decisions based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision) 
b Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education 
c Missing values, n=1, dMissing values, n=2 
e Three-way interaction for momentary aberrant salience × liberal acceptance bias × group as included in the following model (with yij  for psychotic experiences or paranoid experienes as outcome variable): yij  = β0 
+ β1(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij) + β2(LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij) + β3(GROUPj) + β4(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij) + β5(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × 
GROUPj) + β6(LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij  × GROUPj) + β7(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × LIBERAL ACCEPTANCE BIASij  × GROUPj) + ε ij  (full model not shown and available upon request) 
f Difference (Δ) in associations of momentary aberrant salience with i) psychotic and ii) paranoid experiences in the presence vs. absence of liberal acceptance bias across groups: 
 FEP vs. controls  ARMS vs. controls  ARMS vs. FEP 
 adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) P  adj. β (95% CI) p 
         
 Outcome: psychotic experiences 
Δ in associations in the presence vs. absence 
of LA bias (any decision)  across groups -0.01 (-0.16 – 0.14) 0.891  0.16 (0.01 – 0.30) 0.034  0.17 (0.04 – 0.30) 0.013 
          
  Outcome: paranoid experiences 
Δ in associations in the presence vs. absence 
of LA bias (any decision) across groups -0.03 (-0.27 – 0.20) 0.781  0.16 (-0.07 – 0.40) 0.171  0.20 (-0.02 – 0.41) 0.071 
 
Supplementary Table 1. Aggregate ESM scores for stress, negative affect, momentary aberrant salience, threat anticipation and psychotic experiences in FEP, ARMS, and controls 
 FEP  ARMSa  Controls  FEP vs. controls  ARMS vs. controls 
 Mean (S.D.)  Mean (S.D.)  Mean (S.D.)  B (95% CI) p  B (95% CI) p 
            
Psychotic experiences 2.55 (1.27)  2.40 (1.13)  1.47 (0.59)  1.08 (1.01 – 1.15) <0.001  0.93 (0.86 – 1.01) <0.001 
Paranoid experiences 2.47 (1.52)  2.59 (1.50)  1.40 (0.62)  1.07 (0.97 – 1.16) <0.001  1.19 (1.09 – 1.28) <0.001 
Momentary aberrant salience 2.87 (1.27)  2.40 (1.13)  2.19 (1.22)  0.68 (0.59 – 0.77) <0.001  0.21 (0.12 – 0.31) <0.001 
Negative affect 3.04 (1.23)  3.0 (1.08)  1.91 (0.70)  1.13 (1.05 – 1.21) <0.001  1.10 (1.02 – 1.18) <0.001 
Note: ESM, Experience Sampling Method; FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; S.D., standard deviation; CI, confidence interval 
 FEP ARMS Controls 
    
Complianceb (number of valid responses, overall 6064 
(67.4%) valid observations of 9000 possible ESM 
observations) 
   
   Mean 36.16 39.13 45.66 
   S.D. 10.10 10.31 8.16 
   Range (Min – Max) 37 (20 – 57) 39 (21 – 60) 35 (23 – 58) 
Mean percentage within participants 60.3% (33.3 – 95.0%) 65.2% (35.0% – 100%) 76.1% (38.3% – 96.7%) 
Perceived assessment burden, mean (S.D.) 3.72 (1.56) 3.92 (1.56) 3.73 (1.36) 
Completed ESM assessment days, n(%)    
   6 days 50 (98.0) 45 (97.8) 53 (100.0) 
   Less than 6 days 1 (2.0) 1 (2.2) 0 (0.0) 
a ARMS criteria: 1) Schizotypal personality disorder plus a recent decline in function (defined as i) a 30% drop in the Social and Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) score from 
premorbid level, sustained for 1 month, and occurring within past 12 months; or ii) a SOFAS score of 50 or less for past 12 months or longer); 2) First degree relative with psychosis plus a recent 
decline in function (see above); 3) ‘Attenuated’ positive psychotic symptoms; 4) Brief psychotic episode of less than one week duration that resolves without antipsychotic medication 
b Please see Reininghaus et al.9 for a more detailed discussion of compliance in the current study. 
 
 
 
 
 Supplementary Table 2. Liberal acceptance biasa,b between and within FEP, ARMS, and controls over the 6-day  
assessment period  
 FEPc  ARMSd  Controls 
 n (%)  n (%)  n (%) 
      
Presence of liberal acceptance biasa      
 Between, n(%) 25 (50.0)  24 (54.6)  28 (52.8) 
 Within, % 19.9  13.4  8.6 
 Intraclass correlation (95% CI) 0.49 (0.32-0.66)  0.35 (0.19-0.55)  0.11 (0.03-0.37) 
      
Presence of liberal acceptance bias 
(incorrect decisions)b      
 Between, n(%) 23 (46.0)  22 (52.2)  18 (34.0) 
 Within, % 22.4  17.4  16.4 
 Intraclass correlation (95% CI) 0.44 (0.26-0.63)  0.28 (0.13-0.51)  0.07 (0.002-.76) 
Note: FEP, first-episode psychosis; ARMS, at-risk mental state for psychosis; CI, confidence interval 
a Presence of liberal acceptance bias: making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates 
(<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias defined as making decisions based on high probability 
estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
b Presence of liberal acceptance bias: making incorrect decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational 
estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias defined as making incorrect or correct 
decisions based on high probability estimate (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
cMissing values, n=1, dMissing values, n=2 
†Explanatory Note: The proportion of individuals ever showing presence of liberal acceptance bias (i.e., at least once) in the 
6-day assessment period was similar across FEP (between, 50.0%), ARMS (between, 54.6%), and controls (between, 52.8%). 
For those individuals ever showing presence of liberal acceptance bias, this was, on average, the case for 19.9% of 
responses by FEP over the assessment period, compared with 13.4% of responses by ARMS and only 8.6% of response by 
controls (see within percent).  When we examined liberal acceptance bias based on making incorrect decisions based on 
probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates, a higher proportion of FEP (between, 46.0%) and ARMS 
(between, 52.2%) than controls (between, 34.0) ever showed presence of liberal acceptance bias. For those individuals ever 
showing presence of liberal acceptance bias based on making incorrect decisions, this was, on average, the case for 22.4% 
of responses by FEP over the assessment period, compared with 17.4% of responses by ARMS and 16.4% of response by 
controls (see within percent). 
 
 Supplementary Table 3. Fluctuations liberal acceptance bias in FEP, ARMS, and controls  
 unadj. β 95% CI p  adj. βa 95% CI p 
 
adj. βb 95% CI p 
           
Fluctuations in liberal acceptance bias (any 
decision)c        
    
 Variabilitye            
    FEPg vs. controls 0.02 0.004-0.04 0.020  0.02 0.002-0.04 0.029  0.02 0.001-0.04 0.044 
    ARMSh vs. controls 0.01 -0.005-0.03 0.142  0.01 -0.01-0.03 0.253  0.01 -0.01-0.03 0.452 
 Instabilityf            
    FEPg vs. controls 0.04 0.003-0.08 0.035  0.04 -0.0001-0.08 0.056  0.03 -0.01-0.07 0.093 
    ARMSg vs. controls 0.03 -0.006-0.07 0.094  0.03 -0.01-0.07 0.193  0.02 -0.02-0.06 0.398 
             
Fluctuations in liberal acceptance bias (incorrect 
decisions)d        
    
 Variabilitye            
    FEPg vs. controls 0.02 0.01-0.04 0.002  0.03 0.01-0.04 0.002  0.02 0.01-0.04 0.005 
    ARMSh vs. controls 0.02 0.0001-0.03 0.048  0.02 -0.002-0.03 0.082  0.01 -0.01-0.03 0.194 
 Instabilityf            
    FEPg vs. controls 0.05 0.02-0.09 0.003  0.05 0.02-0.09 0.005  0.05 0.01-0.09 0.014 
    ARMSh vs. controls 0.04 -0.001-0.07 0.057  0.03 -0.008-0.08 0.111  0.02 -0.02-0.07 0.256 
Note: FEP, first-episode psychosis; ARMS, at-risk mental state for psychosis; CI, confidence interval 
a Adjusted for age and gender  
b Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education  
c Presence of liberal acceptance bias (any decision): making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal 
acceptance bias defined as making decisions based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
d Presence of liberal acceptance bias (incorrect decisions): making incorrect decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence 
of liberal acceptance bias defined as making incorrect or correct decisions based on high probability estimate (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
e Variability: differences between LA bias in the moment and the average LA bias within individuals over the 6-day assessment period, calculated as the squared difference between LA bias at each 
timepoint and mean LA bias within subjects over time 
f Differences in LA bias from one moment to the next, calculated as the squared difference between LA bias at timepoint t and LA bias at timepoint t-1 within subjects and days 
gMissing values, n=1, hMissing values, n=2
 Supplementary Table 4. Association of fluctuations (variability, instability) in liberal acceptance LA biasa,b with psychotic experiences, paranoid experiences and negative affect by groupc 
 FEPd  ARMSe  Controls  Wald test 
 adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  χ2 (df) p 
    
 Outcome: Psychotic experiences   
Fluctuations in LA bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (any decision)a 0.00 (-0.26 – 0.26) 0.987  0.36 (0.10 – 0.62) 0.007  0.03 (-0.21 – 0.27) 0.793  4.6 (2) 0.100 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (any decision)a -0.07 (-0.27 – 0.13) 0.484  0.37 (0.16 – 0.58) <0.001  0.02 (-0.18 – 0.22) 0.854  10.2(2) 0.006 
Fluctuations in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.10 (-0.39 – 0.19) 0.511  0.08 (-0.22 – 0.38) 0.601  0.08 (-0.26 – 0.41) 0.645  0.9 (2) 0.639 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.12 (-0.37 – 0.12) 0.332  0.12 (-0.14 – 0.38) 0.373  0.15 (-0.14 – 0.44) 0.315  2.6 (2) 0.280 
    
 Outcome: Paranoid experiences   
Fluctuations in LA bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (any decision)a 0.05 (-0.34 – 0.43) 0.817  0.54 (0.15 – 0.93) 0.006  -0.09 (-0.44 – 0.27) 0.632  5.9 (2) 0.052 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (any decision)a -0.10 (-0.35 – 0.16) 0.463  0.31 (0.05 – 0.58) 0.022  -0.05 (-0.31 – 0.21) 0.686  5.6 (2) 0.061 
Fluctuations in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.09 (-0.46 – 0.29) 0.649  0.25 (-0.13 – 0.64) 0.200  -0.05 (-0.50 – 0.39) 0.814  1.8 (2) 0.412 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.14 (-0.41 – 0.14) 0.326  0.17 (-0.13 – 0.47) 0.258  0.01 (-0.34 – 0.35) 0.968  2.2 (2) 0.326 
    
 Outcome: Negative affect   
Fluctuations in LA bias (any decision)a × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (any decision)a -0.00 (-0.35 – 0.35) 0.996  -0.08 (-0.44 – 0.27) 0.645  -0.18 (-0.51 – 0.14) 0.265  0.6 (2) 0.750 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (any decision)a -0.09 (-0.37 – 0.18) 0.516  0.23 (-0.06 – 0.52) 0.120  -0.03 (-0.30 – 0.25) 0.854  2.7 (2) 0.255 
Fluctuations in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b × groupf,g            
 Variabilityd in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.02 (-0.40 – 0.35) 0.905  -0.22 (-0.61 – 0.17) 0.261  -0.20 (-0.64 – 0.24) 0.379  0.6 (2) 0.735 
 Instabilitye in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.14 (-0.46 – 0.17) 0.375  0.10 (-0.24 – 0.44) 0.556  -0.02 (-0.40 – 0.36) 0.917  1.1 (2) 0.585 
Note: FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; df, degrees of freedom; vs., versus; CI, confidence interval 
a LA bias defined making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of LA bias defined as making decisions based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or 
not wanting to make a decision 
b LA bias defined making incorrect decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of LA bias defined as making incorrect or correct decisions based on high 
probability estimate (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision 
c Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education 
d Variability: Differences between momentary LA bias and the average LA bias within individuals over the 6-day assessment period (i.e., squared difference between LA bias at each timepoint and mean LA bias within subjects over time)  
e Instability: Differences in LA bias from one moment to the next, calculated as the squared difference between LA bias at timepoint t and LA bias at timepoint t-1 within subjects and days 
f Two-way interaction for fluctuation in LA bias × group as included in the following model, with yij for psychotic or paranoid experiences or negative affect as outcome variable: y ij  = β0 + β1(FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij) + β2(GROUPj) + 
β3(FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij  × GROUPj) + ε ij  (full model not shown and available upon request) 
g Difference in associations across groups for significant for two-way interaction for LA bias × group: 
 FEP vs. controls  ARMS vs. controls  FEP vs. ARMS 
 adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p 
  Outcome: Psychotic experiences 
Fluctuations in LA bias (any decision)a         
  Variability in LA bias (any decision)a -0.03 (-0.38 – 0.32) 0.868  0.33 (-0.02 – 0.68) 0.068  -0.36 (-0.73 – 0.01) 0.055 
  Instability in LA bias (any decision)a -0.09 (-0.37 – 0.19) 0.532  0.35 (0.07 – 0.64) 0.015  -0.44 (-0.72 - -0.16) 0.002 
Fluctuations in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b         
  Variability in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.18 (-0.62 – 0.27) 0.437  0.00 (-0.45 – 0.45) 0.996  -0.18 (-0.59 – 0.24) 0.405 
  Instability in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.27 (-0.65 – 0.11) 0.164  -0.03 (-0.42 – 0.36) 0.881  -0.24 (-0.60 – 0.12) 0.189 
  Outcome: Paranoid experiences 
Fluctuations in LA bias (any decision)a         
  Variability in LA bias (any decision)a 0.13 (-0.39 – 0.65) 0.620  0.63 (0.10 – 1.16) 0.019  -0.50 (-1.04 – 0.05) 0.074 
  Instability in LA bias (any decision)a -0.41 (-0.41 – 0.32) 0.824  0.37 (-0.01 – 0.74) 0.054  -0.41 (-0.78 - -0.04) 0.030 
Fluctuations in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b         
  Variability in LA bias (incorrect decisions)b -0.03 (-0.62 – 0.55) 0.910  0.31 (-0.29 – 0.90) 0.309  -0.34 (-0.88 – 0.20) 0.216 
  Instability in LA bias (any decision)a -0.15 (-0.59 – 0.30)  0.519  0.17 (-0.29 – 0.62) 0.478  -0.31 (-0.72 – 0.10) 0.134 
         
 
Table 5. Association between momentary aberrant salience, psychotic and paranoid experiences by fluctuations (variability, instability) in liberal acceptance (LA) biasa and groupb  
 FEPc  ARMSd  Controls  Wald test 
 adj. β (95% CI) P  adj. β (95% CI) p  adj. β (95% CI) p  χ
2 (df) p 
    
 Outcome: Psychotic experiences   
Momentary aberrant salience × variabilityc in LA bias 
(any decision)a × groupe          7.6 (2) 0.022 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by variabilityc in LA bias:            
  High variability in LA bias 0.31 (0.26 – 0.37) <0.001  0.42 (0.37 – 0.48) <0.001  0.28 (0.22 – 0.35) <0.001    
  Low variability in LA bias 0.30 (0.25 – 0.35) <0.001  0.33 (0.27 – 0.38) <0.001  0.30 (0.23 – 0.36) <0.001    
  High vs. low 0.01 (-0.05 – 0.08) 0.667  0.10 (0.04 – 0.16) 0.001  -0.01 (-0.07 – 0.05) 0.652    
Momentary aberrant salience × instabilityd in LA bias 
(any decision)a × groupe          6.4 (2) 0.041 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by instabilityd in LA bias:            
  High instability in LA bias 0.31 (0.25 – 0.37) <0.001  0.42 (0.36 – 0.48) <0.001  0.26 (0.18 – 0.33) <0.001    
  Low instability in LA bias 0.28 (0.22 – 0.34) <0.001  0.29 (0.23 – 0.35) <0.001  0.27 (0.19 – 0.35) <0.001    
  High vs. low 0.04 (-0.04 – 0.11) 0.313  0.12 (0.05 – 0.20) 0.001  -0.01 (-0.10 – 0.07) 0.742    
              
 Outcome: Paranoid experiences   
Momentary aberrant salience × variabilityc in LA bias 
(any decision)a × groupe          5.4 (2) 0.067 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by variabilityc in LA bias:            
  High variability in LA bias 0.26 (0.17 – 0.34) <0.001  0.40 (0.32 – 0.49) <0.001  0.25 (0.14 – 0.35) <0.001    
  Low variability in LA bias 0.32 (0.23 – 0.40) <0.001  0.31 (0.23 – 0.40) <0.001  0.28 (0.17 – 0.39) <0.001    
  High vs. low -0.06 (-0.16 – 0.04) 0.210  0.09 (-0.01 – 0.18) 0.068  -0.03 (-0.13 – 0.06) 0.481    
Momentary aberrant salience × instabilityd in LA bias 
(any decision)a × groupe          1.2 (2) 0.556 
 Association between momentary aberrant salience and psychotic experiences by instabilityd in LA bias:            
  High instability in LA bias 0.25 (0.15 – 0.35) <0.001  0.35 (0.25 – 0.44) <0.001  0.22 (0.10 – 0.35) <0.001    
  Low instability in LA bias 0.30 (0.20 – 0.40) <0.001  0.32 (0.22 – 0.41) <0.001  0.25 (0.13 – 0.38) <0.001    
  High vs. low -0.05 (-0.16 – 0.06) 0.389  0.03 (-0.07 – 0.13) 0.558  -0.03 (-0.14 – 0.09) 0.615    
Note: FEP, First-Episode Psychosis; ARMS, At-Risk Mental State for psychosis; df, degrees of freedom; vs., versus; CI, confidence interval  
a Liberal acceptance bias defined as making decisions based on probability estimates that deviate below rational estimates (<20-29%); Reference category: absence of liberal acceptance bias defined as making decisions 
based on high probability estimates (≥20-29%) or not wanting to make a decision) 
b Adjusted for age, gender, and level of education 
c Variability: Differences between momentary LA bias and the average LA bias within individuals over the 6-day assessment period (i.e., squared difference between LA bias at each timepoint and mean LA bias within subjects over time)  
d Instability: Differences in LA bias from one moment to the next, calculated as the squared difference between LA bias at timepoint t and LA bias at timepoint t-1 within subjects and days 
e Three-way interaction for momentary aberrant salience × liberal acceptance bias × group as included in the following model (with yij  for psychotic experiences or paranoid experienes as outcome variable): yij  = β0 + 
β1(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij) + β2(FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij) + β3(GROUPj) + β4(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij) + β5(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × GROUPj) + 
β6(FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij  × GROUPj) + β7(MOMENTARY ABERRANT SALIENCEij  × FLUCTUATION IN LA BIASij  × GROUPj) + ε ij  (full model not shown and available upon request) 
 
 
 
 
